Tuesday, October 14, 2008

Maximizing Shareholder Value


In June 2007, a broad coalition of leading companies, investors, and other stakeholders released the Aspen Principles for Long-Term Value Creation as a call to action to reverse the capital market's bias toward short-term thinking. Among the key corporate actions it identified:

  • Setting long-term metrics that de-emphasize earnings per share and quarterly profits as the metric of choice
  • Incentive systems and compensation schemes that reward long-term focus and success.

More recently, Corporation 20/20 came out with its own set of policies for fostering corporate long-termism. Among the group's key principles is that the corporation shall accrue "fair returns for shareholders, but not at the expense of the legitimate interests of other stakeholders," such as employees, communities, the environment and future generations. One suggestion the group makes for achieving this is reducing the clout of short-term investors (hint: hedge funds) inclined to quick fixes to boost short-term profits. One lever the group suggests is requiring investors to hold shares for a year before before gaining voting rights or increasing capital gains taxes on short-term trades. Similarly, compensation incentives might be changed to modify or even outlaw stock options, or make bonuses contingent on achieving social and environmental performance targets.

It's All in Our Heads!


It's all in our heads!

New research shows that financial ups and downs are largely related to the way our brains are hard wired...

People make dismal financial decisions for a host of reasons including:

Too much focus on short-term gains and pleasures.
  • A strong tendency to imitate other people in one's decisions and actions.
  • Too much of a focus on specific outcomes rather than a consideration of the big picture.
  • Relatively quick forgetting of negative events experienced in the past.

  • Why are we buried in debt?

    Social comparison: We get into debt because we need to look good. Related to this is entitlement — you need to have the house, the SUV, the lifestyle because you deserve it and other people like you have it. We 'one up' one another, creating a spiral of consumption and debt."

    Unrealistic optimism: People in general believe they will be healthier, have fewer accidents and do better in life than the average person. Risks will turn out OK.

    Self-delusion: Maybe it's not as bad as it seems. "They" will find a solution.

    Interesting reading!





    Vatican Bank


    "We have no uncollectable losses."

    I just saw an interesting post which itemizes the Vatican bank's financial situation.

    While it is in no way comparable to financial disclosures common to Western, secular banking institutions, it is probably the most detailed Vatican financial disclosure that you are likely to see this side of St. Peter's pearly gates.

    One comment stood out: the bank makes no loans and as a result "we have no uncollectable losses."

    If only all those Wall Street titans could say the same thing!

    Friday, October 10, 2008

    How Does Banking Work?

    From:

    From a good friend and worth sharing.

    --------------------------------------

    This is a pretty dry but concise explanation of how our banking systems works if you are interested – otherwise, you can provide to kids so they can plagiarize on upcoming homework assignments.

    A Short Banking History of the United States

    Why our system is prone to panics.

    By JOHN STEELE GORDON

    We are now in the midst of a major financial panic. This is not a unique occurrence in American history. Indeed, we've had one roughly every 20 years: in 1819, 1836, 1857, 1873, 1893, 1907, 1929, 1987 and now 2008. Many of these marked the beginning of an extended period of economic depression.

    How could the richest and most productive economy the world has ever known have a financial system so prone to periodic and catastrophic break down? One answer is the baleful influence of Thomas Jefferson.

    Jefferson, to be sure, was a genius and fully deserves his place on Mt. Rushmore . But he was also a quintessential intellectual who was often insulated from the real world. He hated commerce, he hated speculators, he hated the grubby business of getting and spending (except his own spending, of course, which eventually bankrupted him). Most of all, he hated banks, the symbol for him of concentrated economic power. Because he was the founder of an enduring political movement, his influence has been strongly felt to the present day.

    Consider central banking. A central bank's most important jobs are to guard the money supply -- regulating the economy thereby -- and to act as a lender of last resort to regular banks in times of financial distress. Central banks are, by their nature, very large and powerful institutions. They need to be to be effective.

    Jefferson's chief political rival, Alexander Hamilton, had grown up almost literally in a counting house, in the West Indian island of St. Croix , managing the place by the time he was in his middle teens. He had a profound and practical understanding of markets and how they work, an understanding that Jefferson , born a landed aristocrat who lived off the labor of slaves, utterly lacked.

    Hamilton wanted to establish a central bank modeled on the Bank of England. The government would own 20% of the stock, have two seats on the board, and the right to inspect the books at any time. But, like the Bank of England then, it would otherwise be owned by its stockholders.

    To Jefferson, who may not have understood the concept of central banking, Hamilton 's idea was what today might be called "a giveaway to the rich." He fought it tooth and nail, but Hamilton won the battle and the Bank of the United States was established in 1792. It was a big success and its stockholders did very well. It also provided the country with a regular money supply with its own banknotes, and a coherent, disciplined banking system.

    But as the Federalists lost power and the Jeffersonians became the dominant party, the bank's charter was not renewed in 1811. The near-disaster of the War of 1812 caused President James Madison to realize the virtues of a central bank and a second bank was established in 1816. But President Andrew Jackson, a Jeffersonian to his core, killed it and the country had no central bank for the next 73 years.

    We paid a heavy price for the Jeffersonian aversion to central banking. Without a central bank there was no way to inject liquidity into the banking system to stem a panic. As a result, the panics of the 19th century were far worse here than in Europe and precipitated longer and deeper depressions. In 1907, J.P. Morgan, probably the most powerful private banker who ever lived, acted as the central bank to end the panic that year.

    Even Jefferson 's political heirs realized after 1907 that what was now the largest economy in the world could not do without a central bank. The Federal Reserve was created in 1913. But, again, they fought to make it weaker rather than stronger. Instead of one central bank, they created 12 separate banks located across the country and only weakly coordinated.

    No small part of the reason that an ordinary recession that began in the spring of 1929 turned into the calamity of the Great Depression was the inability of the Federal Reserve to do its job. It was completely reorganized in 1934 and the U.S. finally had a central bank with the powers it needed to function. That is a principal reason there was no panic for nearly 60 years after 1929 and the crash of 1987 had no lasting effect on the American economy.

    While the Constitution gives the federal government control of the money supply, it is silent on the control of banks, which create money. In the early days they created money both through making loans and by issuing banknotes and today do so by extending credit. Had Hamilton 's Bank of the United States been allowed to survive, it might well have evolved the uniform regulatory regime a banking system needs to flourish.

    Without it, banking regulation was left to the states. Some states provided firm regulation, others hardly any. Many states, influenced by Jeffersonian notions of the evils of powerful banks, made sure they remained small by forbidding branching. In banking, small means weak. There were about a thousand banks in the country by 1840, but that does not convey the whole story. Half the banks that opened between 1810 and 1820 had failed by 1825, as did half those founded in the 1830s by 1845.

    Many "wildcat banks," so called because they were headquartered "out among the wildcats," were simple frauds, issuing as many banknotes as they could before disappearing. By the 1840s there were thousands of issues of banknotes in circulation and publishers did a brisk business in "banknote detectors" to help catch frauds.

    The Civil War ended this monetary chaos when Congress passed the National Bank Act, offering federal charters to banks that had enough capital and would submit to strict regulation. Banknotes issued by national banks had to be uniform in design and backed by substantial reserves invested in federal bonds. Meanwhile Congress got the state banks out of the banknote business by putting a 10% tax on their issuance. But National banks could not branch if their state did not allow it and could not branch across state lines.

    Unfortunately state banks did not disappear, but proliferated as never before. By 1920, there were almost 30,000 banks in the U.S. , more than the rest of the world put together. Overwhelmingly they were small, "unitary" banks with capital under $1 million. As each of these unitary banks was tied to a local economy, if that economy went south, the bank often failed. As depression began to spread through American agriculture in the 1920s, bank failures averaged over 550 a year. With the Great Depression, a tsunami of bank failures threatened the collapse of the system.

    The reorganization of the Federal Reserve and the creation of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation hugely reduced the number of bank failures and mostly ended bank runs. But there remained thousands of banks, along with thousands of savings and loan associations, mutual savings banks, and trust companies. While these were all banks, taking deposits and making loans, they were regulated, often at cross purposes, by different authorities. The Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Reserve, the FDIC, the FSLIC, the SEC, the banking regulators of the states, and numerous other agencies all had jurisdiction over aspects of the American banking system.

    The system was stable in the prosperous postwar years, but when inflation took off in the late 1960s, it began to break down. S&Ls, small and local but with disproportionate political influence, should have been forced to merge or liquidate when they could not compete in the new financial environment. Instead Congress made a series of quick fixes that made disaster inevitable.

    In the 1990s interstate banking was finally allowed, creating nationwide banks of unprecedented size. But Congress's attempt to force banks to make home loans to people who had limited creditworthiness, while encouraging Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to take these dubious loans off their hands so that the banks could make still more of them, created another crisis in the banking system that is now playing out.

    While it will be painful, the present crisis will at least provide another opportunity to give this country, finally, a unified banking system of large, diversified, well-capitalized banking institutions that are under the control of a unified and coherent regulatory system free of undue political influence.

    Mr. Gordon is the author of "An Empire of Wealth: The Epic History of American Economic Power" (HarperCollins, 2004).

    Monday, October 6, 2008

    Why The Recession /Depression?

    John Higgins of Capital Economics offers his analysis of why this is happening:

    If policymakers think that adding extra liquidity is going to solve the credit crunch on its own, they are going to be sorely disappointed. This is because upward pressure on interbank rates is a consequence, not a cause, of the crisis.

    It is a shortfall of bank capital that has made financial institutions reluctant to lend to one another. Boosting liquidity is therefore only a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for stabilising the financial sector. In fact, until banks are adequately recapitalised, funding
    pressures may even get worse.

    This also explains why the markets’ reaction to the passage of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA) has been so lukewarm. Bank capital will only get a lift from the $700 billion “troubled asset relief program” if the authorities overpay for the assets they buy.”

    -----------

    John Higgins is Capital Economics’ Senior Market Economist with 15 years of experience in financial markets as a trader, analyst and economist. John is tasked with identifying value in global asset markets based on our macroeconomic and policy projections. He contributes to and edits our Capital Daily and is responsible for producing regular updates and thematic pieces on key market developments.

    John joined the company in 2008 from Stone & McCarthy Research Associates, where he was Senior Economist covering the euro area. Previously John worked at Nomura International plc in London, where he was Head of Economic and Credit Research within the fixed income division. John has considerable experience presenting at conferences and seminars, and speaking with the media. He holds a degree from Exeter University.




    FDIC: On Both Sides?

    According to a press report, the FDIC seems to be on both sides of the Wachovia dispute between CitiGroup and Wells Fargo.

    It was clear from documents filed in federal court Sunday that Wachovia was in considerable trouble when it agreed to the deal. Wachovia disclosed that it agreed to the deal "with the understanding that a seizure of its banking assets later that day by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. would occur" unless it accepted Citigroup's proposal.

    Four days later, San Francisco-based Wells Fargo & Co. stunned Citigroup by announcing that Wachovia's board had agreed to its $14.8 billion all-stock offer. Originally, the deal was valued at $15.1 billion, or $7 a share, but Wells Fargo stock declined after it was announced.

    Wells Fargo also said it would need no FDIC assistance to complete the takeover, which would be aided by a new IRS rule designed to make it easier for banks to offset losses from loans and other bad debts held by other banks they acquire.

    According to an affidavit filed by Robert Steel, Wachovia's president and chief executive in federal court Sunday, he was approached by FDIC Chairman Sheila Bair late Thursday; Bair told him that Wells Fargo was prepared to propose a merger transaction "and encouraged me to give serious consideration to that offer."

    One of Wachovia's attorneys then advised Bair that unless Wachovia had a signed and board-approved merger agreement from Wells Fargo, it could not consider the proposal, the affidavit said.

    The FDIC said Friday it "stands behind its previously announced agreement with Citigroup." It also said it would review all proposals and work with all three institutions to resolve the tug-of-war. An FDIC spokesman did not return calls for comment on Sunday.

    Wednesday, October 1, 2008

    NYSE Specialists

    The following link isn't currently working properly, and I have reported it to CNN. But because of its importance to our study of finance and investments, I am posting the article here.

    http://money.cnn.com/news/newsfeeds/articles/djf500/200809301638DOWJONESDJONLINE000624_FORTUNE5.htm

    Specialists' Moves Monday May Have Staved Off Bigger Market Fall

    Dow Jones
    September 30, 2008: 04:38 PM EST

    NEW YORK -(Dow Jones)- Black Monday could have been even darker. Proponents of open-outcry trading say that specialist market makers on the New York Stock Exchange, faced with a flood of selling orders late Monday, took the buy side or aggressively solicited for buyers on several large financial companies that were selling off.

    By assuming the role of buyers or soliciting them, these specialists may have helped limit losses at the bell. In this solicitation, specialists that represent some financial
    companies said they would take buy orders in a late crossing session - a move that helped create a floor to some of the selling and kept an even bigger decline from occurring.

    "If this was purely electronic, it could have been down 1200 or 1300 on the Dow," said Bernie McSherry, a senior vice president with Cuttone & Co., the largest independent floor operator at the NYSE.

    For the session, the Dow lost more than 777 points as the defeat of a proposed $700 billion bailout package in the U.S. House of Representatives sent traders scrambling. At many Wall Street companies, traders reacted to live footage of the vote count on the floor of Congress around 2 p.m. EDT with heavy selling.

    Going into the 4 p.m. close, brokers on the NYSE floor say specialists published huge sell imbalances in many financial names, but were actively looking to find buyers. Specialists surveyed their books to find brokers that had purchased the financials on their books at certain levels in the past and went asking again. To solidify this negotiation, specialists made verbal commitments to settle up buy trades in a late crossing session, while continuing to execute sell orders. While this helped specialists pare some of the large positions they would have to keep on their books thanks to the
    trade imbalance, it also served to help create a floor on some of the trading.

    "[Specialists] created trades that otherwise would not have occurred...when someone alerts a broker and says look at this, you create an interest. That facilitates trading that doesn't happen in other markets," said Dave Humphreville, president of the Specialist Association, which represents market makers on the floor of the NYSE.

    Still, a trader at one leading Wall Street algorithmic firm said the volume of stock handled by the specialists was small compared with the overall listed volume, and may not have had a broad impact.

    Overall, specialists executed 141.5 million shares on Monday, more than double the 63.4 million shares they execute on an average day year-to-date. Overall volume was high, however, with about 7.3 billion shares trading on the NYSE Composite, meaning that the specialists handled about 1.9% of the volume.

    "The New York Stock Exchange floor in general is shrinking as things go more electronic," the trader at the electronic-trading unit said. The dark pool, an electronic crossing network that is an alternative to stock exchanges, at this firm and others are seeing record volumes during the recent volatility. One such venue traded half a billion shares in a single session earlier in September.

    As for who bought from specialists, representatives for two floor brokers say specialists disseminated information out to "anyone in the stock market community" that they would take these buy orders in an extended session. The "specialist helps in price discovery so, if they slow the market down, there would be better price discovery," said Tim Mahoney, chief executive of Bids Holdings, an electronic trading group that has partnered with the NYSE.

    Among the names that changed hands in the crossing session were some of the large banks, including JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPM), Bank of New York Mellon Corp. (BK), and Morgan Stanley (MS). "The specialists performed an important function by soliciting contra-side buy interest and that helped cushion some of the downward
    move. It's happened on a stock by stock basis over the years, but I haven't really seen that happen on as broad a basis before," said McSherry.

    Nonetheless, the "selling imbalance" at the close of the session, when sell orders flooded in, meant that prices slipped steadily during the extended trade. After being down fewer than 600 points at the closing bell, the Dow had taken a loss of 738 points by 4:12 p.m. EDT and at 4:15 p.m. EDT, when all orders were processed and closed, the loss was more than 777 points.

    The Standard & Poor's 500 also took a long time to settle at its final close, ending down 8.8%. The Nasdaq Composite, which settled more quickly than the other two indices and had no specialist involvement, fell 9.1% - a comparable loss. "A lot of [specialists] went home way more long than they usually do. It's not what they like to do, but there was a buyers' strike towards the close," said Ray Pellecchia, a spokesman for the NYSE.

    -By Geoffrey Rogow, Dow Jones Newswires; 201-938-5360; geoffrey.rogow@
    dowjones.com